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The study suggests that gender inequality acts as a significant constraint to growth in 
sub-Saharan Africa, and that removing gender-based barriers to growth will make a 
substantial contribution to realizing Africa’s economic potential. In particular we 
highlight gender gaps in education, related high fertility levels, gender gaps in formal 
sector employment, and gender gaps in access to assets and inputs in agricultural 
production as particular barriers reducing the ability of women to contribute to 
economic growth. By identifying some of the key factors that determine the ways in 
which men and women contribute to, and benefit (or lose) from, growth in Africa, 
we argue that looking at such issues through a gender lens is an essential step in 
identifying how policy can be shaped in a way that is explicitly gender-inclusive and …/ 
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beneficial to growth and the poor. We also argue that in some dimensions and channels 
of the gender-growth nexus, the evidence is only suggestive and needs further detailed 
research and analysis. Investigations of the linkage between gender inequality and 
growth should therefore be a priority for development economics research in coming 
years. 
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1 Introduction 
Since at least the mid 1970s, sub-Saharan Africa’s growth performance has lagged 
behind all other developing regions, with large and rising income gaps compared with 
the rapidly growing economies in East and South Asia. This poor growth performance 
has translated into a similarly poor performance in terms of poverty reduction, with 
Africa having the highest poverty rates (incidence as well as depth using the 
international $1-a-day poverty line) and showing no progress in meeting MDG1 since 
the early 1980s (Chen and Ravallion 2004). Africa also suffers from a low poverty 
elasticity of growth, largely due to its high inequality, which by now is among the 
highest in the developing world (World Bank 2005a). 
 
The presumed sources of slow growth in African economies have been analyzed by 
many authors,1 and range from the institutional legacy of colonialism, geographic 
challenges, trade and debt-related issues, high ethnic diversity, high incidence of 
conflict, demographic issues, weak institutions, considerable inequality, as well as poor 
economic policy choices. While these factors are clearly important contributors to 
Africa’s poor economic prospects, we show that there is by now considerable evidence 
that gender inequality in various dimensions also plays a significant role in accounting 
for the poor growth performance in Africa, and can help us further our understanding of 
growth determinants.2 These issues range from inequalities in education and formal 
sector employment to gender gaps in access to and control over important economic 
assets and productive inputs, and issues of governance. As we show below, there is 
considerable evidence that these gaps not only disadvantage women and thus are 
inequitable, but reduce the growth potential in the region, and thus are partly 
responsible for the poor progress in poverty reduction in Africa.3 
 
The study suggests that gender inequality plays a significant role in accounting for 
Africa’s poor growth and poverty reduction performance.4 It argues that removing these 
inequalities would be an important precondition for addressing Africa’s growth 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Sachs and Warner (1997); Collier and Gunning (1999); Acemoglu et al. (2001); 
Easterly and Levine (1997); Mkandawire and Soludo (1999). 
2 For example, Blackden and Bhanu (1999); World Bank (2001); Klasen (1999). 
3 This study focuses on the growth effects of gender inequality. This is not to deny the importance of the 
equity implications and welfare implications of such inequalities. For a discussion, see Klasen (2004c; 
forthcoming).  
4 While poverty reduction is not only affected by growth but also by distributional change, gender issues 
could affect poverty reduction also by affecting such distributional change. This is an issue discussed in 
more detail in Klasen (forthcoming) where it is shown that the impact of gender inequality on growth is 
much larger and more important for poverty reduction than the impact of gender inequality on 
distributional change.     2
problems. To do so, this study focuses on the theoretical insights relating to gender and 
growth linkages and complements this with some recent empirical evidence. The next 
section of the study discusses the theoretical insights on gender and growth, 
highlighting the particular difficulties associated with gender-based analysis in a 
situation where market and household productive activities are often intertwined at the 
household level, an interdependence that is not fully captured in standard economic 
analyses. Section 3 provides some current evidence on the main gender issues that are 
particularly important for growth, including gender gaps in education, formal sector 
employment, access to assets and resources (particularly in agriculture), and gender 
gaps in time use. We then conclude in section four with some policy-focused and 
research-oriented recommendations. 
2  Theoretical linkages between gender and growth in sub-Saharan Africa 
Growth theory suggests that economic growth depends on the accumulation of 
economic (including human) assets, and the return on these assets, which in turn depend 
on technological progress, the efficiency with which assets are being used, and the 
institutional frameworks of production. The different strands of the growth literature all 
agree on these factors but differ in the way these factors interact to generate sustainable 
growth. Gender issues will naturally come into play in the way all of these factors 
influence economic growth. As discussed below, there may be gender differences in the 
way human assets are being generated and accumulated, and gender issues may also 
play a role in the way physical assets (including land but also other physical capital) are 
being maintained and augmented. In addition, gender issues may play a role in 
influencing technological progress, as well as the efficiency with which assets are being 
used to produce incomes. Lastly, gender issues may influence institutions, both public 
and private, which can help or hinder the efficiency of resource use. The relevant 
literature in each of these factors will be discussed below. 
2.1 Methodological  constraints 
It is important to highlight a few particular difficulties in analyzing these gender issues 
as they relate to economic growth. First, many gender differences relate to the way 
households decide on production and consumption matters.5 As we discuss in the next 
section, the household plays a particularly important role as a producer of economic 
goods as well as human assets in Africa and thus a full understanding of the gender 
issues involved requires an analysis of household, and especially intra-household, 
issues. This is an area economics has historically shied away from, where our data are 
often quite patchy, and the evidence is circumstantial.  
 
                                                 
5 In addition, economic options and incentives are different—that is, the choices people can make are 
going to be driven by non-economic control factors that are not uniform for men and women.   3
Second, the importance of gender issues may not be as directly visible as some other 
issues affecting growth, due to the fact that a considerable share of the economic 
contribution of women is not included in national income aggregates and income-based 
poverty measures.6 This has two important implications. First, the economic 
contribution of women to wellbeing and poverty (in a wider multidimensional 
perspective) is understated in conventional national income and poverty statistics. 
Similarly, the economic constraints women face in their productive activities, and how 
they differ from those faced by men, often do not receive enough attention. Researchers 
interested in uncovering the gender dynamics of growth issues will have to move 
beyond direct influences of gender inequality on growth and include complex indirect 
influences. As shown below, indirect linkages might include issues such as the 
‘quantity’ and ‘quality’ of children, the importance of time constraints for women’s 
productive activities, and the impact of intra-household relations and resource control 
issues on women’s willingness to invest in the improvement of land or in technical 
progress. Lastly, there are some issues that are traditionally viewed as non-economic but 
which can clearly have economic implications. Those include issues such as violence 
against women that affects their ability to produce, ‘cultural’ constraints on women’s 
economic activities, and issues of control over resources within households that may 
heavily influence household decision making about the allocation of resources for the 
accumulation of assets and/or the efficiency of asset use. These questions make it more 
difficult to identify clearly the role of gender issues in growth. But they make them no 
less important. 
2.2 Theoretical  insights 
By now, there is a considerable theoretical literature suggesting that gender differences 
in asset accumulation and use can have significant growth effects. In particular, a 
number of models find that gender inequality in education and employment reduce 
economic growth. The main arguments from the literature, which are discussed in more 
detail in Klasen (1999; 2002) are briefly summarized below.  
 
With respect to gender inequality in education, the theoretical literature suggests that 
such gender inequality reduces the average amount of human capital in a society and 
thus harms economic performance. It does so by artificially restricting the pool of talent 
from which to draw for education, thereby excluding highly qualified girls (and taking 
less qualified boys instead). Moreover, if there are declining marginal returns to 
education (and imperfect substitutability between males and females), restricting the 
education of girls to lower levels while educating boys at higher levels means that the 
marginal return to educating girls is higher than that of boys and thus would boost 
overall economic performance.7 
                                                 
6 See UNDP (1995); Blackden and Bhanu (1999); Klasen (2005a; forthcoming). 
7 See Knowles et al. (2002); World Bank (2001); Schultz (1993)   4
A second argument relates to positive externalities of female education, that is positive 
effects that are not captured by the beneficiaries themselves (who, of course, also profit 
from higher education).8 Promoting female education or earnings is known to reduce 
fertility levels, reduce child mortality levels, and promote the education of the next 
generation. Each factor in turn has a positive impact on economic growth. As shown in 
some models,9 these effects can be large enough to ensure that some countries are 
trapped in a low-level equilibrium with large gender gaps in education or earnings, high 
fertility rates, low investment in each child, and consequently low levels of per capita 
incomes.10 This would be particularly relevant for low-income countries that have not 
entered the demographic transition—as applies to a significant number of countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)—and which might be stuck in such a low-level poverty 
equilibrium, partly due to high gender inequality.  
 
Related to this argument, some authors have emphasized that reducing gender gaps in 
education will help initiate the demographic transition that will, with some time lag, 
lead to a favourable age distribution in a population, known as the ‘demographic gift’, 
in which the share of working age people is particularly high, compared to the declining 
cohorts of the young and not yet large cohorts of the elderly. This phase of the 
demographic gift can lead to higher savings and investment rates, and higher 
worker/capita ratios, all of which would boost per capita GDP (Bloom and Williamson 
1998). 
 
A third argument is that gender gaps in employment impose a similar distortion on the 
economy as do gender gaps in education. They artificially reduce the pool of talent from 
which employers can draw, thereby reducing the average ability of the workforce 
(Klasen and Lamanna 2003). In a related model by Esteve-Volart (2004), gender gaps in 
access to managerial positions and employment more generally distort the allocation of 
talent and the production and productivity of human capital, all of which serve to reduce 
economic growth. 
 
Some authors have emphasized a fourth argument which also relates to education and 
employment inequalities.11 They argue that low gender gaps in education and 
employment, combined with relatively large gender gaps in pay can be a source of 
competitive advantage in the promotion of export-oriented industries that draw heavily 
on female labour. These authors highlight the export-oriented growth strategies of East 
                                                 
8 Note that in this study we are primarily concerned with gender gaps in education, and thus do not focus 
on absolute education levels which would, as is well known, also contribute to pro-poor growth.   
9 See, for example, Lagerlöf (2003); Galor and Weil (1996); World Bank (2001). 
10 Lagerlöf emphasizes gender gaps in education, while Galor and Weil concentrate on earnings gaps.  
11 See, for example, Seguino (2000).   5
Asian economies where shrinking gender gaps in education and employment coincided 
with high gender pay gaps.12 
 
A fifth argument relates to the importance of female employment for their bargaining 
power within families. There is a sizable literature that demonstrates female 
employment and earnings increase their bargaining power in the home.13 This not only 
benefits the women concerned, but their greater bargaining power has been shown to 
lead to greater investments in the health and education of their children, thus promoting 
human capital of the next generation and therefore improving the potential for economic 
growth.14  
 
A sixth argument relates to access to productive assets and inputs. In situations where 
women and men undertake different and/or separate productive activities (as is the case 
in agriculture in much of Africa but also in non-agricultural activities in many 
developing countries), differential access to productive assets and inputs constitutes a 
distortion in the sense that ‘women’s activities’ are under resourced and under 
capitalized while ‘male activities’ are (comparatively) over resourced and over 
capitalized. Due to declining marginal returns and/or the loss associated with talented 
women being starved of economic resources, such a distortion reduces aggregate 
output.15 Such gender gaps might not only lead to static inefficiency but also reduce 
efficient investments in new technologies16 and the maintenance and improvement of 
assets, including particularly land.  
 
A seventh argument relates to time constraints women face due particularly to high 
burdens associated with household tasks and large families. These constraints sharply 
reduce the ability of women to engage in market production, and thus their assets are 
not being used in ways that is captured by income growth and income poverty 
statistics.17 This is partly a measurement issue where important wellbeing related 
production is taking place within households that is not being counted in national 
accounts and thus in GDP growth. It is also an issue of an indirect growth linkage, as 
the ability of households to produce output and maintain and enhance assets importantly 
depends on this invisible and uncounted labour. Lastly, it is an issue related to the 
efficiency of asset use. To the extent that this labour, due to poor technology and 
                                                 
12 For a critical review of this argument and its empirical substantiation, see Klasen (1999; 2002; 
forthcoming). See also Seguino (2000). 
13 Klasen and Wink (2002); World Bank (2001); Sen (1990). 
14 Thomas (1997); World Bank (2001). 
15 World Bank (2001; 2005a); Udry (1996). 
16 Jones (1986); von Braun and Webb (1989). 
17 UNDP (1995); Blackden and Bhanu (1999); Bardhan and Klasen (1998); World Bank (2005b); 
UPPAP (2002); Blackden and Wodon (2006).   6
infrastructure, exhibits very poor productivity levels, it growth would be lower even if 
this labour were fully captured in income statistics. Thus, it is not only a measurement 
issue but also an issue directly related to the efficiency of asset use, particularly the 
human assets of women.   
 
An eighth argument relates to governance. There is a small but growing literature that 
has suggested that women are less prone to corruption and nepotism than men (World 
Bank 2001). Improving access to women to the workforce and decision making bodies 
is therefore likely to improve governance in business and government. Similarly, there 
is a literature arguing that policies to achieve greater female political participation (such 
as quotas as in the case of India) can lead to the prioritization of investments of 
particular importance to women such as time-saving infrastructure and human capital 
which in turn can promote economic growth (Duflo and Chatthopadhyay 2003; World 
Bank 2001). Thus there are a large number of plausible theoretical arguments 
suggesting that gender gaps in education, employment, access to assets and inputs, and 
time use can have a negative impact on economic growth. The relevance and economic 
importance of these arguments, however, is largely an empirical matter to which we 
turn presently.  
2.3 Empirical  findings 
On the empirical side, there is now a considerable body of cross-country evidence that 
has shown gender inequality in education to reduce economic growth substantially.18 
While the point estimates of the size of the effects differ somewhat between studies, the 
results seem quite robust, as the studies use very different econometric approaches, time 
periods, country samples, and model specifications. In particular, they all suggest that 
gender inequality in education accounts for a sizable portion of the empirically observed 
growth differences between countries and regions. 
 
Based on these empirical findings it is possible to estimate growth effects for countries 
that will not meet the education target for the MDG for gender equality. As shown by 
Abu-Ghaida and Klasen (2004) the estimated growth effects are quite substantial. There 
is also some cross-country and cross-regional evidence (although less robust at this 
stage)19 that gender inequality in employment, both in terms of access to employment 
as well as type of employment (position in hierarchy and sectors, for instance) similarly 
reduces economic growth (Klasen 1999; Klasen and Lamanna 2003; Besley et al. 2004). 
There is also a wealth of micro evidence that points out that gender inequalities in 
access to productive assets (such as land, fertilizer, seeds, credit, etc.) reduce the 
                                                 
18 See, for example, Dollar and Gatti (1999); Forbes (2000); Knowles et al. (2002); Klasen (2002); 
Yamarik and Ghosh (2003). 
19 Investigations of the employment–growth nexus suffer from poor employment data that are often not 
comparable across countries, as well as potential endogeneity problems that are not easily addressed.   7
productivity of female producers and most often by more than the same inequality 
increases the productivity of male producers.20  
 
In addition, there is overwhelming cross-country and micro evidence that gender 
inequality in education leads to higher fertility, higher child mortality, higher 
undernutrition, and lower educational investments21 with the effects often being quite 
large. As shown by Abu-Ghaida and Klasen (2004), if countries were able to eliminate 
gender inequality in educational enrolments by 2005, they would reap considerable 
benefits in terms of these indicators. To the extent that these factors in turn influence 
economic growth, they are part of the reason why gender inequality in education 
reduces economic growth and thus increases poverty. Since these indicators are also 
development goals in their own right, promoting gender equality in education would 
reduce ‘education poverty’, ‘health poverty’, and ‘nutrition poverty’. It would also be 
important to investigate to what extent the effects of gender inequality in education on 
these development outcomes are larger (or smaller) among the poor. But given the 
empirical findings that gender gaps in education are larger among the poor than the non-
poor and that some of the effects of gender gaps in education (e.g. on fertility) are also 
larger among the poor than the non-poor, it is clear that policies to boost enrolments 
would particularly help poor women and thus make a direct contribution to poverty 
reduction in income and non-income dimensions.  
 
Furthermore, there is a lot of evidence showing that women’s bargaining power has a 
significantly positive impact on investments in children’s education, health, and 
nutrition.22 Women’s bargaining power is, in turn, heavily influenced by their 
employment status, their education, and their access to unearned incomes; for instance, 
inheritances, remittances, state transfers.23 Improving the bargaining power of poor 
women would therefore lead not only to beneficial effects on the women themselves, 
but one would be able to reap considerable externalities in terms of improved outcomes 
for their families, with positive repercussions for economic growth. 
 
Finally, there is some evidence that women’s empowerment is associated with improved 
governance and reduced corruption, as women tend to have a lower propensity to 
engage in such behaviours (World Bank 2001; Swamy et al. 2001). This may be one of 
the reasons why gender gaps in education and employment are associated with lower 
                                                 
20 For surveys of this literature, see Blackden and Bhanu (1999); World Bank (2001); Bamberger et al. 
(2001); World Bank (2002). 
21 Schultz (1997); Klasen (1999); Smith and Haddad (1999); World Bank (2001); Abu-Ghaida and 
Klasen (2004). 
22 Thomas (1997); World Bank (2001); Lundberg et al. (1997); Murthi et al. (1995). 
23 World Bank (2001); Sen (1990); Murthi et al. (1995); Klasen and Wink (2002; 2003).   8
growth.24 There is also some evidence that greater female participation in political 
decision making at local levels can improve investments in priorities of women 
policymakers, which in turn are likely to improve the contribution of women to 
economic growth (Duflo and Chattophadyay 2003).  
 
Thus, the theoretical and empirical literature strongly suggests that improving gender 
equality in education, employment, access to productive assets, and in greater female 
bargaining power improves growth and other valuable development outcomes. In the 
education dimension, the findings are quite conclusive while in other dimensions 
(including employment, access to asset and inputs) the evidence is more sparse and 
certainly merits much closer attention in further research. We now assess the relevance 
of, and evidence for, these linkages for growth and poverty reduction in Africa, through 
an analysis of the most important gender gaps in Africa.  
3  Gender gaps in education, employment, access to productive resources and 
agriculture in Africa 
Both the general literature on gender and development (World Bank 2001) as well as 
specific works on Africa (World Bank 2000) have argued that reducing gender 
inequalities can be a powerful force for growth and poverty reduction in Africa. To 
assess how important the various gender issues are in the African context, it is useful to 
briefly review the evidence and most important gender gaps as they relate to education, 
employment, and other issues such as agriculture and access to resources.  
3.1  Gender and education 
Table 1 shows that SSA is, along with South Asia, a region with the largest gender gap 
in education, both at the level of enrolment as well as at the level of attainment. The 
initial gaps are an inheritance from the colonial period where overall levels of education 
were low and gender gaps were considerable, although smaller than in South Asia 
(Klasen 2002). More worryingly, the absolute growth in education has been slower than 
in other regions so that the absolute levels of female attainment (or enrolments) in SSA 
are now below those of South Asia, which had not been the case previously. Thus, we 
are faced with a generalized education crisis in Africa. As women have had the most to 
gain from an expansion of education, the failure to accelerate the expansion of 
schooling has led to the low female attainments as well as large persistent gaps (see 
Abu-Ghaida and Klasen 2004). Important exceptions to this generally bleak picture 
include many countries of southern Africa (with the exception of Zimbabwe) as well as 
Uganda, where education has expanded considerably and gender gaps have fallen 
rapidly. Such expansion of education was typically accompanied by specific measures 
to reduce the costs of schooling (including, for example, free primary education in 
                                                 
24 See, for example, Klasen and Lamanna (2003); Sauer (2001).   9
Uganda, Lesotho, and Tanzania) and significant investments in the expansion of 
schooling infrastructure and teachers. 
 
Combining the insights from the cross-country literature about the effects of gender 
gaps in education with the evidence on gender gaps in Africa, it is possible to estimate 
the amount of growth ‘loss’ associated with both the large initial gender gaps in 
education and the slow pace of reduction in these gaps.25 Comparing Africa with East 
Asia and the Pacific, Klasen (2002) finds that some 0.6 percentage points in annual 
growth differences (of a total of 3.5 percentage points) between the two regions in 
1960-92 can be accounted for by the higher gender gaps in Africa and the slower pace 
of reducing them. This is quite apart from the additional growth differences that arise 
from differences in initial overall education levels and the much slower growth in 
overall educational attainments. 
 
Within Africa, growth differences can partly be attributed to considerable differences in 
levels and changes of gender gaps in education. We focus on Uganda here as a case 
study.26 Table  2 shows that fully 1.3 percentage points of the growth differences 
between Uganda and Botswana can be accounted for by the much larger initial gender 
gaps in education in Uganda as well as the much slower pace of closing these gaps. 
 
Since the mid 1980s, Uganda has been able to expand its education much faster than 
previously and has also reduced the gender gaps considerably. The female-male ratio of 
the expansion of schooling in the 1990s stood at 1.03, meaning that females expanded 
their schooling slightly faster than males. We also show how gender inequality since 
1990 has affected growth based on the same growth regressions. Predictably, the effect 
is much smaller now, accounting for about 0.65 percentage points in the growth 
difference with Botswana, and 0.34 percentage points in the growth difference with East 
Asia. Interestingly, the effect of the female-male ratio of the growth of education is now 
negative suggesting that, compared with Botswana and East Asia, Uganda was closing 
its gender gap in education more quickly. But since Uganda had a much larger initial 
gender gap in 1990, the overall effect of gender inequality on growth held down growth, 
certainly compared with Botswana and East Asia. 
                                                 
25 One should caution that these are point estimates that represent average effects of gender gaps in 
education. For an individual country (or region) the actual effect might be larger or smaller and, in any 
case, is sensitive to any measurement and specification errors in the underlying regressions.  
26 See World Bank (2003a) for a related estimation in the context of Kenya. See also Klasen (2004a; 
2004b).   10
Table 1: Enrolment rates and attainment by gender 
  Primary Gross Enrolment Rate  Secondary Gross Enrolment Rate  Average Years of Attainment 
b 
  1975 1999 1975 1999 1970  1995 
Region Females Males Females Males Females Males  Females Males Females Males Females Males 
East Asia & Pacific  108 121 106 105 35 49  60 65 3.06 4.54 5.85 6.84 
Europe & Central Asia  .. .. 93 95 .. ..  80 81 8.09 8.93 9.67 9.20 
Latin America & Caribbean  97 100 130 133 34 35  87 80 3.52 4.14 5.58 5.91 
Middle East & North Africa  64 99 91 99 24 44  67 72 1.39 2.75 4.21 5.74 
South Asia  58 91 91 110 15 33  41 57 1.08 2.95 2.94 5.31 
Sub-Saharan Africa
a 45 66 73 85 6 13  23 28 1.56 2.60 2.82 3.98 
Note: 
aLatest available data on primary GERs are from 1998 and on secondary GERs from 1996. 
bAttainment data include schooling beyond secondary. Since data are from 
Barro and Lee (2000), the regional classification includes some countries with per capita incomes too high to be included in the World Bank’s database (the one used for the 
GERs).  
Source: World Development Indicators central database and Barro and Lee (2000). 
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Table 2: Estimating the effect of gender inequality in education on growth differences 
between Uganda and Botswana or East Asia 
 1960-2000  1990-2000 
 Direct Total Direct  Total
Uganda versus Botswana   
Effect of gender inequality in 1960  0.45 1.14 0.29  0.73
Ratio of gender inequality in 
growth of education  0.13 0.18 -0.06  -0.08
Total 058 1.32 0.23  0.65
Uganda versus East Asia   
Effect of gender inequality in 1960  0.18 0.46 0.14  0.36
Ratio of gender inequality in 
growth of education  0.28 0.37 -0.02  -0.02
Total 0.46 0.84 0.12  0.34
Source: Authors calculations based on Klasen and Lamanna (2003).  
 
Since Uganda’s introduction of universal primary education (UPE) in 1997, educational 
enrolments have risen and gender gaps have closed, both at increasing rates. However, 
Uganda was still expected to miss the 2005 MDG on gender equity in education (due to 
remaining gaps at secondary level). Using results from Klasen (2002) and Knowles 
et al. (2002) and comparing the projected path of educational enrolments with a path 
that would allow Uganda to meet the MDG, Abu-Ghaida and Klasen (2004) estimated 
that failing to meet the MDG would lead to lower growth of 0.1-0.2 percentage points 
per year between 1995 and 2005, and less than 0.1 percentage points after 2005. This 
shows that sizeable growth costs can result from persistent gender gaps in education.27 
 
As shown by Abu-Ghaida and Klasen (2004) and Klasen (2005b), many other African 
countries have not been nearly as successful in reducing gender gaps in enrolments as 
stipulated in the education-focused target of MDG3. In fact, of the 36 or so countries 
(with at least a population of 500,000) which have probabaly missed this MDG3 target 
(gender equality in primary and secondary enrolment rates in 2005), the majority (24) 
are from SSA.28 As estimated by Abu-Ghaida and Klasen, the growth costs of missing 
this MDG3 target are considerable. For example, countries such as Togo are projected 
to suffer from 0.3 per cent lower growth between 1995 and 2005, and 0.5 per cent per 
                                                 
27 The 2002/3 Ugandan National Household Survey (UNHS) suggests that Uganda is also closing the 
gender gap in secondary education, faster than anticipated, although gaps still remain and the second 
generation economic reforms need this higher skilled labour. 
28 As the data for enrolments in 2005 will only be available later in 2006 or early 2007, the exact 
numbers of countries that have failed to meet the target is still not known and the information presented 
here is based on the most up-to-date projections.    12
year slower growth between 2005 and 2015 as a result of failing to reach the MDG3 
target. Thus, failing to reach this target entails significant growth costs, but also delays 
progress in attaining other important MDGs. For example, as a result of failing to reach 
the target, Mozambique is projected to have 0.3 children per women more and Mali is 
projected to suffer from a 26/1000 higher under-five mortality rate in 2015.  
3.2  Gender and employment 
In contrast to some other regions, a distinguishing characteristic of SSA economies is 
that women have particularly high labour force participation rates, largely related to 
their high activity rates in agriculture. Female activity rates (percentage of women aged 
15-64 that are economically active) as measured by the ILO are estimated to be around 
67 per cent in Africa, far higher than in most other regions (except Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia). In contrast to other regions, however, these activity rates have fallen 
slightly over the past 40 years while they have risen strongly elsewhere (Klasen and 
Lamanna 2003).  
 
One method of capturing the dynamics associated with the different economic 
contributions of men and women is through the ‘gender intensity of production’ in 
different sectors. 29 Adopting this methodology, and using ILO labour force data, Gueye 
has estimated the gender intensity of production for each country in SSA (Appendix 
Table A1).30 Although highly aggregated, and based on 1990 data comparable across 
countries, the estimates provide some indication of the respective contributions of men 
and women in African economies, and suggest a high degree of variability across 
countries and sectors. For example, men contribute 2/3, and women 1/3, to African 
GDP, with women’s contribution ranging from a low of 26 per cent to a high of 52 per 
cent.31 Bearing in mind that these estimates are based on national income accounting, 
and thus are likely not to fully capture (due to measurement issues) women’s non-
market production, these shares are very large, certainly when compared with other 
regions.  
 
Issues relating to gender gaps in African employment are quite different from most 
other developing regions. The large contribution of women (see Appendix Table A1) to 
measured GDP in Africa is largely driven by the substantial and often preponderant role 
they play in the agricultural sector. In some parts of agricultural production, women 
                                                 
29 The gender intensity of production relates the sex-specific employment shares with the overall 
structure of the economy to provide an assessment of what share of output is produced by males and 
females respectively. For details, see Elson and Evers (1997).  
30 Aissatou Gueye, economist at UNECA, while on secondment at the World Bank in 2002. 
31 It is probable that these estimates understate women’s contribution to their economies, although they 
also do not take account of gender differences in productivity.    13
perform most of the tasks.32 This important role of female labour in agricultural 
production implies that access to assets and inputs for their productive activities can 
have significant growth effects. This is particularly the case when women and men work 
on separate plots or separate tasks, where gender differences in access to inputs, 
technology, and assets will affect the overall productivity of agriculture (see below). 
 
In the industrial sector, women tend to play a much smaller role with some notable 
exceptions such as the textile and garment industries in a few African states (for 
example Lesotho, Mauritius, and Madagascar). In the service sector, the shares vary 
greatly and represent a rather heterogeneous mix of public services, community and 
health services, as well as tourism and other services reflecting the diverse nature of 
services in African economies.  
 
This important distinction between formal and informal sectors cannot be deduced from 
the data and other studies have to be considered, which show that the informal sector is 
particularly large in Africa, and uses a great deal of female labour (ILO 2002; Blunch 
et  al. 2001). Excluding South Africa, the share of informal employment in non-
agricultural employment is 78 per cent, rising to 83 per cent if agriculture is included. 
Self employment represents 70 per cent of informal employment in SSA and 53 per cent 
of total non-agricultural employment. Outside agriculture, more than 60 per cent of 
women are in informal employment. In SSA, more than 84 per cent of women non-
agricultural workers are informally employed compared with 63 per cent of men. 
Although women’s participation rates are lower compared with men, they are important 
in street vending (90 per cent), home-based workers (80 per cent) and as home workers 
(80 per cent).33 
 
Considering the overall economic contribution of the informal sector, we estimate the 
share of the informal sector in non-agricultural GDP in SSA to be 41 per cent. This 
compares with 29 per cent in LAC, and 41 per cent in Asia. Country data suggest that 
the informal sector contributes 58 per cent to GDP in Ghana and 13 per cent in Mexico. 
In Tanzania, the informal sector contribution is estimated at 43 per cent. In Burkina 
Faso, of a 36 per cent overall GDP contribution, 29 per cent comes from women while 7 
per cent is from men. In Kenya, out of the total 25 per cent, 11 per cent comes from 
women and 14 per cent from men, and in Mali 26 per cent from women and 14 per cent 
                                                 
32 Data compiled by IFPRI indicate that African women perform about 90 percent of the work of 
processing food crops, hoeing and weeding, 80 percent of the work of food storage and transport from 
farm to village, and 60 percent of the work of harvesting and marketing (Quisumbing et al. 1995). Time 
allocation data throughout SSA confirm women’s predominant role in agricultural activities. In Zambia, 
for example, the preponderance of women’s labour in agriculture is illustrated by time allocation studies 
which show women’s greater labour contribution to crop production including, significantly, export crop 
production.  
33 Home-based workers refers to those who carry out market work at home or adjacent premises, while 
home work refers to those who carry out work on a piece rate basis for businesses from home.    14
from men (Charmes 1998). Given the overall figures, the high participation of females 
in informal activities suggests that their representation in formal sector employment is, 
conversely, low. Data from the ILO suggest that formal sector employment rates in SSA 
are not any higher than in South Asia or the Middle East, and are much lower than in 
East Asia, Latin America, or ECA (Klasen and Lamanna 2003).  
 
With respect to the economic impacts of this crowding of women in informal activities 
and their associated low share in formal sector employment, Klasen and Lamanna 
(2003) estimate the simultaneous impact of gender gaps in education and formal sector 
employment on economic growth in a panel framework. They find that both gender 
gaps in education and formal sector employment reduce economic growth. In fact, the 
(still preliminary) estimates suggest even larger growth costs for gender gaps in formal 
sector employment than in education. This is also corroborated by findings from South 
Asia where gender gaps in employment are also particularly large (Esteve-Volart 2004). 
 
To illustrate one example, based on the cross-country regressions mentioned above and 
1992 census data on employment for Uganda from 1992, the growth difference 
accounted for by gender inequality in education and employment between East Asia and 
Uganda could amount to 0.6-0.7 per cent per year in the 1990s. If gender inequalities in 
non-agricultural and particularly formal sector employment persist, the costs of these 
gaps could mount considerably in future as the country will have to rely increasingly on 
non-agricultural employment.34 Related to this is evidence on the impact of the under-
utilized potential of women in non-farm employment more generally. Using household 
data for both Ghana and Uganda, Canagarajah et al. (2001) showed non-farm 
employment to be an important area of growth in SSA. In particular, they found that 
women’s labour force participation had increased substantially within a period of 5-6 
years in the 1990s, leading to lower poverty rates. Using poverty decompositions for 
both countries, they show that the contribution of growth to poverty reduction from this 
increased female employment in the non-farm sector is larger than the contribution from 
redistribution, findings consistent with many other countries.35 Related analyses from 
Uganda show that women entrepreneurs face significant gender-based obstacles to 
establishing and operating their businesses, including access to finance, land and non-land 
assets, justice services, and information. These in turn limit Uganda’s capacity to expand 
such non-farm enterprises (Ellis et al. 2006). 
                                                 
34 This receives further confirmation by estimates of returns to education. As shown by Mpuga (2003), 
employed women have higher returns to education than employed men Female returns to education 
appear to have been rising more than male returns in recent years suggesting great demand for higher 
female employment (Klasen 2004a). 
35 Given that non-agricultural employment does not play such a quantitatively large role in Uganda at 
present (as a share of GDP or the labour force), the impact of gender inequalities in access to such 
employment is likely to be smaller than in regions with larger shares of non-agricultural employment 
(such as the Middle East and North Africa; see Klasen and Lamanna 2003). See also Barret et al. (2001); 
Cleaver and Donovan (1995).   15
It therefore appears that women are an under-utilized resource in non-farm formal sector 
employment. This is also related to the type of growth strategies that have been adopted 
by African countries. Evidence from East Asia as well as selected African countries 
(including Tunisia, Morocco, Lesotho, and Mauritius) show that growth strategies that 
are based on export-oriented and labour-intensive light manufacturing is highly 
dependent on using female labour. In the countries that have adopted such a strategy, 
gender gaps in formal sector employment have become smaller and overall growth has 
been higher.36 The potential to combine greater female employment in manufacturing 
with such an export-oriented growth strategy appears sizeable and merits must closer 
investigation.  
3.3 Gender  inequalities in agriculture 
Given women’s important role as agricultural producers, the conditions of production 
are of particular importance for both growth and poverty reduction in Africa. It is quite 
difficult to generate quantitative evidence on the efficiency effects of gender inequalities 
in access to land, inputs, and control over resources. This is due to the fact that in many 
African countries (particularly in eastern and southern Africa) women and men 
collaborate on agricultural production by each providing certain inputs and, thus, it is 
very difficult to determine the efficiency of these inputs quantitatively. Or they produce 
different products where once again it is not easy to estimate the efficiency of 
production and thus the growth effects of existing gender gaps, although there is some 
evidence of the consequences of such gaps. For example, comparative evidence from 
Kenya suggests that men’s gross value of output per hectare is 8 per cent higher than 
women’s. However, if women had the same human capital endowments and used the 
same quantities of factor inputs as men, the value of their output would increase by 22 
percent. Hence, women’s productivity appears well below its potential. Capturing this 
potential productivity gain by improving the circumstances of women farmers would 
substantially increase food production in SSA, thereby significantly reducing the level 
of food insecurity in the region. If these results from Kenya were to hold in SSA as a 
whole, simply raising the productivity of women to the same level as men could 
increase total production by 10 to 15 per cent.37  
 
In places where women and men produced the same products on different plots, it is 
easier to see whether gender gaps affect efficiency. There is some evidence that gender 
gaps in input use significantly reduce overall efficiency of agricultural production. For 
example, studies by Udry (1996) and Udry et al. (1997) from Burkina Faso show that 
                                                 
36 Given the importance of trade for Africa’s growth and poverty reduction prospects the different 
economic roles of men and women in SSA are especially significant in the area of trade expansion. See 
Seguino (2000); World Bank (2003b); Klasen (forthcoming). 
37 See Saito et al. (1994). See also World Bank (2003a) and World Bank (1989); Horenstein (1989) on 
further evidence about consequences of gender gaps in Kenya on aggregate performance.    16
plots operated by women receive much less fertilizer and other inputs than those of men 
and if these inputs were equalized, aggregate output would rise by 10-15 per cent. 
Similar findings have been reported for other countries such as Zambia and Ghana 
(Blackden and Bhanu 1999; Goldstein and Udry 2002). 
 
In addition to these static inefficiencies, there is considerable evidence about gender 
gaps in the adoption of new technologies. Such gender gaps have been visible for some 
time and it was usually assumed that they relate to gender gaps in education, as well as 
gender bias in agricultural extension services. For example, Blumberg (1992) has 
demonstrated that where women are targeted for extension services they produce higher 
yields. However, while such factors are important, more recent evidence suggest that 
additional constraints relate particularly to women’s time burdens and competing 
responsibilities as well as the critical question of who controls the proceeds of such 
investments in new technologies, including export-oriented cash crop production.38  
3.4  Linkages with non-market work and the time burden 
The different structural roles of men and women in the market economy (notably 
agriculture and the informal sector) are coupled with their equally different, and 
unbalanced, roles in the household economy. A further distinguishing characteristic of 
African economies is that the boundary between economic and household activity is less 
well drawn in Africa than in other regions (Gelb 2001). Women bear the brunt of 
domestic tasks—processing food crops, providing water and firewood, and caring for 
the elderly and the sick (especially important in the context of HIV/AIDS). In particular, 
the impact of HIV/AIDS is not limited to the ‘visible’ market economy, but has an 
equally, if not more, significant impact on the ‘invisible’ economy, yet this productive 
work is unrecorded and not included in the System of National Accounts (SNA). It is 
estimated that 66 per cent of female activities in developing countries are not captured 
by the SNA, compared with only 24 per cent of male activities (Elson and Evers 1997). 
 
Considering African examples of time allocation statistics, for Cameroon, in the Centre 
province, men’s total weekly labour averages 32 hours, whilst for women it is more than 
64 hours. Even though much of this disparity results from differences in domestic 
labour hours (31 hours a week for women and 4 for men) a significant difference was 
also observed in agricultural labour hours: 26 a week for women and 12 for men (Henn 
1988). Village transport surveys in Tanzania and Zambia also show that women spend 
nearly three times as much time in transport activities compared with men, and they 
                                                 
38 For example, Demery et al. (1993) show that time constraints reduce women’s ability to invest in tea 
growing in Kenya. Jones (1986) shows that women in Senegal are reluctant to invest in rice as they do not 
control the proceeds from this production and are insufficiently compensated for their inputs (see also von 
Braun and Webb 1989). Lastly, Kasente et al (2000) and Booth et al. (2003) suggest that women are 
reluctant to invest in export-oriented cash crop production as they would not control the proceeds and 
such investments would generate a particularly large and unaffordable time burden for them.    17
transport about four times as much in volume (Malmberg-Calvo 1994; Barwell 1996). 
Moreover, fertility rates in Africa continue to be extremely high and have been reduced 
quite slowly in recent years, even in countries that have had considerable growth such 
as Uganda. Gender differences in time use are therefore exacerbated by very high 
fertility rates that continue to pose a disproportionate burden on women and prevent 
their greater participation in productive activities outside of the home. These unequal 
time burdens are not only an issue of equity, but also one of productivity. The high 
overall time burden, especially time spent on low-productivity household tasks 
(transport tasks associated with fuel and water collection, and food product processing 
and transformation) reduces the productivity of female labour and thus constrains their 
ability to contribute to growth and poverty reduction.39 
 
Overall, therefore, the African situation appears to be large gender gaps in education 
and low overall female educational achievements, considerable gender gaps in formal 
sector employment, and a predominance of women in the informal and agricultural 
sectors, where they face considerable gender-based differences in access to and control 
of land, modern inputs, time, and other productive assets and resources. 
4  Conclusions and policy implications 
Notwithstanding extensive analysis and research, many of the conventionally accepted 
factors which determine growth and poverty reduction outcomes do not fully explain 
Africa’s poor growth and poverty reduction performance. In this study, we outline the 
emerging findings about the importance of gender inequality and its relationship to 
growth in Africa. We have found that there is considerable evidence that gender gaps in 
education and formal sector employment reduce growth, that inequalities in access to 
land and productive inputs reduce agricultural productivity, investment, and 
modernization, and that inequalities in time burdens, alongside the high demographic 
burden, all contribute to reducing women’s ability to participate effectively in, and 
benefit equally from, growth and poverty reduction in Africa.  
 
Some of the policy implications have been well recognized. There are efforts underway 
to improve female education and reduce gender gaps in many African countries, with 
some recent notable successes in some countries. Key to overcoming the education 
stagnation and the gender gaps have been significant investments in education sector, 
lifting of user fees for primary education, and special programmes to target female 
education. Africa’s high population growth and the disproportionate burden it places on 
women is also generally recognized, although there is much scope for improvement in 
                                                 
39 A more extensive analysis of ‘time poverty’ and its relationship to growth and consumption poverty 
can be found in Blackden and Wodon (2006).   18
ensuring better access to reproductive health and family planning services, and more 
could be done to promote smaller family sizes.  
 
Unfortunately, there is much less progress on efforts to improve women’s access to 
formal sector employment. As Africa will need to shift slowly its workforce from 
agriculture to the non-agricultural sector, improving employment opportunities for 
women will be critical. Indeed, women could play a key role in developing and 
implementing export-oriented growth strategies. Similarly, much remains to be done to 
improve equity in resource access and control in agriculture. In this area, there has been 
little progress and a gender-informed growth agenda would have to address improving 
women’s greater land ownership and security of tenure and more equal access to 
modern inputs. Some of these changes might be supported by legislation and changes in 
agricultural policies. Others will depend on changes in intra-household relations, which 
are less amenable to government intervention although targeted support to female 
producers could play an important role here.  
 
Lastly, it is critical that there be concurrent investment in areas which reduce women’s 
excessive time burden. Here, time- and labour-saving infrastructure could play a role, 
especially in rural areas, including giving greater priority to water supply and sanitation, 
energy for household needs, access to appropriate means of transport commensurate 
with men’s and women’s different transport burdens, and investment in labour-saving 
technology in the area of food product transformation and processing. In addition, an 
acceleration of demographic change, would contribute markedly to alleviating women’s 
time burdens, as well as making MDG targets more attainable. 
 
Apart from summarizing the main findings and its policy implications, it is important to 
lay out a forward looking research agenda. While the evidence on the effects of gender 
gaps in education on growth is now quite substantial and robust, the impact of gender 
gaps in employment should receive much greater attention. Moreover, estimation of the 
efficiency costs of gender gaps in agriculture still relies on small-scale micro studies in 
specific settings, including often just purely qualitative results. It is necessary to 
investigate thoroughly the impact of gender gaps in access to land, modern inputs, and 
technologies using advanced quantitative and econometric techniques to better 
understand these processes and design appropriate solutions.  
 
We hope to have shown that gender is a critical economic issue for Africa, directly 
linked to growth and poverty reduction outcomes, and not a marginal social or women’s 
issue concerned with equity. While much more remains to be done to show the 
particular ways gender gaps undermine Africa’s growth potential, as well as policy 
measures needed to address them, what is already clear is that the linkages between 
gender inequality and growth in SSA deserve considerably more analysis and more 
policy attention.    19
Appendix 
Table A1: Estimates of the gender intensity of production by country and sector 












 Pop.(m) US$m Agr. Ind. Ser. M F M F M F M F
ANGOLA 12.7 10,260.3 18 41 41 46.3 53.7 88.8 11.2 64.6 35.4 71.2 28.8
BENIN   6.3 1,845.0 36 13 51 50.8 49.2 76.5 23.5 49.4 50.6 53.4 46.6
BOTSWANA 1.6 3,765.8 5 56 39 69.3 30.7 73.3 26.7 43.9 56.1 61.7 38.3
BURKINA FASO  11.3 2,764.6 33 22 45 52.2 47.8 53.0 47.0 61.2 38.8 56.4 43.6
BURUNDI 6.8 1,132.1 56 19 25 47.7 52.3 80.6 19.4 91.2 8.8 64.9 35.1
CAMEROON 15.1 11,151.7 25 29 46 56.0 44.0 87.2 12.8 76.0 24.0 74.2 25.8
CAPE VERDE    0.4 338.7 14 21 65 58.7 41.3 78.8 21.2 50.3 49.7 57.5 42.5
C.A.R 3.6 1,487.5 48 20 33 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
CHAD    7.7 1,738.6 29 18 53 51.9 48.2 89.9 10.1 71.8 28.2 69.3 30.7
COMOROS 0.6 250.0 41 9 50 50.0 50.0 77.5 22.5 84.1 15.9 69.6 30.4
CONGO, D.R.  51.4 9,347.7 30 28 42 47.7 52.3 83.6 16.4 67.7 32.4 66.1 33.9
CONGO, REP.  2.9 2,798.7 13 41 46 38.8 61.2 88.4 11.6 68.4 31.6 72.7 27.3
COTE D'IVOIRE  16.0 10,796.0 33 23 44 61.5 38.6 81.0 19.1 76.7 23.3 72.6 27.4
EQUAT. GUINEA  0.5 132.1 61 11 28 56.3 43.7 86.2 13.9 85.7 14.3 67.8 32.2
E R I T R E A  4 . 1 . .. .. .. . 4 9 . 5 50.5 81.3 18.8 57.1 42.9 .. ..
ETHIOPIA 64.3 6,841.7 49 13 38 59.0 41.0 59.0 41.0 56.9 43.1 58.2 41.8
GABON   1.2 5,952.3 7 43 50 49.8 50.2 72.8 27.2 56.8 43.2 63.2 36.8
GAMBIA, THE   1.3 316.9 29 13 58 49.6 50.4 88.0 12.0 74.0 26.0 68.8 31.2
GHANA   19.2 5,886.0 45 17 38 52.8 47.2 45.2 54.8 43.7 56.3 48.0 52.0
GUINEA 7.4 2,818.0 24 33 43 49.4 50.6 76.5 23.5 69.9 30.1 67.2 32.8
GUINEA-BISSAU 1.2 244.0 61 18 21 54.9 45.1 81.8 18.2 90.5 9.5 67.2 32.8
KENYA   30.1 8,533.2 29 19 52 51.5 48.5 73.0 27.0 49.7 50.3 54.6 45.4
LESOTHO 2.2 622.2 23 34 43 45.6 54.4 93.3 6.7 58.7 41.3 67.4 32.6
LIBERIA 3.1 .. .. .. .. 54.8 45.2 93.4 6.6 71.8 28.2 .. ..
MADAGASCAR    15.5 3,081.3 33 14 53 49.3 50.7 80.3 19.7 73.1 26.9 66.2 33.8
MALAWI 11.0 1,802.9 45 29 26 44.8 55.2 90.0 10.0 81.3 18.8 67.4 32.6
MALI 10.8 2,421.2 46 16 38 51.3 48.7 53.0 47.0 65.3 34.7 56.9 43.1
MAURITANIA 2.7 1,019.6 30 29 41 49.8 50.3 83.6 16.4 56.7 43.3 62.4 37.6
MAURITIUS   1.2 2,642.5 12 32 56 77.8 22.2 53.9 46.2 82.4 17.7 72.7 27.3
MOZAMBIQUE 17.6 2,512.1 37 18 45 44.1 55.9 94.2 5.8 84.4 15.6 71.3 28.7
NAMIBIA 1.7 2,529.6 11 35 54 50.7 49.3 72.4 27.6 70.2 29.8 68.8 31.2
NIGER   10.8 2,480.7 35 16 49 51.6 48.4 78.1 21.9 58.1 41.9 59.0 41.0
table continues…   20
NIGERIA 126.9 28,472.5 33 41 26 64.5 35.5 84.8 15.2 63.2 36.8 72.5 27.5
RWANDA 8.5 2,584.4 33 25 42 47.7 52.3 86.2 13.8 80.6 19.4 71.2 28.8
S A O  T O M E ,  P . R .   0 . 1 5 7 . 6 2 8 1 8 5 5. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
SENEGAL 9.5 5,698.4 20 19 61 52.9 47.1 77.5 22.5 71.5 28.5 68.9 31.1
SEYCHELLES    0.1 368.6 5 16 79 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
SIERRA LEONE  5.0 896.8 47 20 33 56.8 43.2 90.7 9.3 66.7 33.3 66.9 33.1
SOMALIA 9.7 917.0 65 .. .. 50.1 49.9 89.6 10.4 71.7 28.3 .. ..
SOUTH AFRICA  42.8 111,997.0 5 40 55 73.2 26.9 82.7 17.3 48.5 51.5 63.4 36.6
SUDAN   29.7 1,316.7 .. .. .. 67.3 32.7 24.4 15.6 82.5 13.5 .. ..
SWAZILAND 1.0 859.9 14 43 43 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
TANZANIA 33.7 4,258.7 46 18 36 46.2 53.9 80.0 20.0 66.7 33.3 59.6 40.4
TOGO 4.7 1,628.4 34 23 43 60.4 39.6 72.0 28.0 53.2 46.8 60.0 40.0
UGANDA 22.1 4,304.5 57 11 32 49.9 50.1 79.1 20.9 56.5 43.5 55.3 44.7
ZAMBIA 10.1 3,288.4 21 49 30 49.0 51.0 83.6 16.4 61.4 38.6 69.7 30.3
ZIMBABWE 12.1 8,783.9 16 34 50 44.4 55.6 83.6 16.4 50.7 49.3 60.9 39.1
TOTAL/AVG 658.3 282,945.9 19.9 33.7 46.9 61.9 38.1 80.3 19.7 57.8 42.2 65.0 35.0
Source: Calculations made by Aissatou Gueye (UNECA), while on secondment with the World Bank, May 
2002. The principal data source is GenderStats on the World Bank’s website, accessible at 
http://genderstats.worldbank.org/. 
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